CHALLENGES FACING EXTERNAL ACTOR INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA PEACE BUILDING PROCESSES

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Abstract : **External actor involvement in peace building processes has historically been global. In contemporary times, this has happened in Europe namely in Kosovo, Bosnia and Yugoslavia. It has also happened in Asia, Latin America and Africa. In Africa, such cases were witnessed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Somalia. Somalia has experienced one of the longest civil wars attributed to the collapse of the state in 1991 which resulted into the destruction of social fabrics and institutions necessary for governance making Somalia the most insecure and chaotic country in the world. In spite of its homogeneity of using the same language and adhering to the same religion, Somalia has remained an area with widespread lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and human rights abuses topping the list of failed states index in the world. The study investigated the external actor involvement influencing peace building processes in Somalia. It explored to find out whether external actor involvement in peace building have been successful or not and the challenges facing it. The general objective was to evaluate the external actor involvement including state and non-state actors influencing peace building processes in Somalia. The study specifically undertook to explore the nature, assess the role and examine the challenges facing external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes. This study was anchored within the power relations theoretical framework which brought out the different perspectives in state behaviour and interactions in the international system. It utilized a conceptual framework in analyzing power relations in external actor involvement in Somalia with emphasis on AMISOM, IGAD, Kenya and Ethiopia. The study was mainly conducted in Gedo area in the Southern parts of Somalia that borders with Kenya and Ethiopia and employed the questionnaire, Focus Group Discussion and semi-structured interview methods of data collection. The study was justified due to the fact that Somalia conflict has had major implications to global terrorism and regional insecurity affecting Kenya and Ethiopia directly as frontline states. In the conceptual framework, the study borrowed key tenets from the theory of realism and the neo functionalism theory. The study utilized the explanatory research design to obtain information concerning the current status of external actor involvement in peace building processes in Somalia. It used the purposive, stratified and snowball sampling techniques. A total of 392 people out of targeted 425 population participated in different ways in the information gathering processes for the study. The findings were presented descriptively. Ethically, the questions were framed in consideration of the willingness of respondents with regard to sensitivities associated with the conflicts and terrorist groups that have exploited the Somalia peace buildings. The study found out that the external actor involvement influencing peace building processes in Somalia are either military or civilian with uncoordinated and shared mandates. Their activities are ineffective because they are reconstruction oriented rather than recovery. This study has identified and addressed these gaps by way of recommendations to policy makers and scholars. The study recommends adoption of a lead agency in an integrated peace mission and multidimensional mission planning approach that would incorporate all the different actors characterizing the Somalia peace building context. This would ensure effective planning, coordination and execution processes by different external actors interested in a addressing the interdependence.**

Keywords: Peace Building, External Actor.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Somalia conflict has had major implications on Kenya's security given that the two countries share a long and porous border. Owing to cultural links, the Somalia people are found in both countries and often exchange visits on either side. The problems created by the long Somali conflict are many and have not been confined to Somalia alone, but have had spill over effects to the neighbours. There is no doubt therefore, that the Somali conflict impacts heavily on Kenya's national interests, hence the need for this study. The effects of the Somali problems are felt in Kenya because of the common border, which divides the Somali people into four different nationalities of Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The Colonial powers arbitrarily drew the colonial frontiers without regard to the ethnic group's interests dividing their culture or the economic potential. In essence the boundaries were artificial and very often have caused inter-state conflicts especially in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, which has been the most affected, is centre to many disputes in the region. It continues to experience civil wars, which are clan-based and these often impact negatively against Kenya's national security [14].

Somalia is universally pictured as a country synonymous with terrorism, clannish, conflict, civil war, violence, warlords, famine, jihad, piracy and underdevelopment. The country has been engulfed in violent conflict for more than two decades. The immediate cause of the Somali conflict relates to power competition in the post-colonial government. In 1960, Somalia held successful presidential elections in which Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was elected President. In 1967, Abdirshid Ali Sharma'arke was voted in as President in elections which were also generally peaceful. However, the regime of President Sharma'arke was characterized by political instability which led to his assassination and a subsequent military coup by Mohamed Siad Bare. President Bare's regime was also characterized by an oppressive dictatorial rule, wars and a weakening economy. His military regime lasted until 1991 when he was toppled during an outbreak of civil war [6]. This marked the collapse of the Somali state with cessation of government services and a long catalogue of chaos and human suffering [15]. The ensuing intolerable humanitarian conditions included famine, disease, and endless civil wars.

According to [10] and [16], the collapse of the Somalia state triggered a massive exodus of Somalis into the Diaspora. Humanitarian crises followed with the USA and UN intervening, albeit unsuccessfully between 1992 and 1995. This heralded the start of Somalia's diplomatic and economic isolation. The international relief and security operation that followed brought help to needy populations, but failed to bring to an end the inter-clan wars and militia conflicts which continued. Poverty reinforced by major droughts and famine ensued, further deepening the impact of war and displacement of thousands of civilians.

However, after over two decades of war and more than fifteen peace conferences to resolve this conflict, Somalia has a weak federal government based in Mogadishu with little control and influence in the other parts of the country. There are also over 22000 African troops in the country mandated by the UNSC and African Union (AU) to support Somalia's government fighting Al-shabaab (A terrorist Al-Qaeda affiliated organization). These troops also help the Somali government to build the Somali security forces to take over the security in the country. A UN assistance mission in the country known as UNSOM is also operating to facilitate and organize humanitarian and other strategic policy advice to the Somali government in peace and reconciliation process.

Despite failure to establish a Somali central state in over two decades, parts of the country made significant progress in terms of security, reconciliation and peace building. The southern regions of Somalia that include Gedo area that borders Kenya and Ethiopia and the Northern parts of Somali regions formerly the British Somaliland, have made substantial progress towards peace and governance [17]. Locals in those regions formed the "Somaliland", administration, a secessionist self-declared state. Likewise, the North-eastern regions of the country made a successive reconciliation in those regions and formed the "Puntland" regional autonomy of Somalia [10].

The international conflict management system [UN] established shortly after the Second World War in 1945 has proved remarkably durable in the face of deep and challenging global conflicts. A number of conflicts have been resolved through UN interventions while some has remained protracted- as the case of Somalia which has now witnessed a decade of conflicts despite UN and AU interventions. [18] argue that the international and regional external actor involvement in

resolving the Somalia conflicts failed due to poor strategies employed and Somalia has remained a battlefield despite physical intervention by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. According to [12], the United Nations, African Union through AMISOM as non-state actors, the Federal Government of Somalia and other external state actors are now making progress in stabilizing Somalia. A variety of legal, administrative and diplomatic mechanisms are involved in conflict management and the relationships and interactions between the mechanisms themselves create multiple avenues of engagement as evidenced in Somalia since 1991. This study, therefore, seeks to examine the external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes.

1.2 Statement Of The Problem

Civil war is one of the manmade disasters that causes the death and loss of many lives. After the end of the cold war it is observed that major wars became less while regional and domestic conflicts between nations still exist and leads to the pressure of outside states and external institutions to intervene. In today's world many countries are going through civil war with different intentions including different political views and religious beliefs. In some parts of the world these civil wars are expanding and initiating the network of terrorism. As a result terrorism and national security became two of the main issues being prioritized by most of the nation states across the globe. To stop these civil wars and prevent the growing rate of terrorism, the international community is using different methods including peace building as a means of solution 1998.

The collapse of Somalia as a state in 1991 triggered looting, lawlessness and subsequent massive exodus of Somalis into the Diaspora. External actors and humanitarian assistants who responded to Somalia crisis faced challenges in executing their core mandate and suffered heavy casualties in the hands of militias. According to [10], this marked the beginning of Somalia's socio-political, security and economic isolation.

A growing problem has been identification of appropriate peace building mechanisms in Somalia. External actors eager to resolve the conflicts are not seen as neutral inside Somalia, or have a history there which renders them suspect in the eyes of some Somalis. The UN itself has a controversial and difficult history in the country ranging to the blame of misdiagnosis, poor methodology and delayed interventions in 1993 eroding its potential to broker peace talks. The Somali crisis has increasingly reflected a divide between factions backed by Ethiopia and Kenya versus those enjoying backing in the Arab world. Neither the African Union nor the League of Arab States are viewed as neutral on Somalia affairs [20].

The IGAD is divided and viewed by Somalis as currently dominated by Ethiopia and Kenya who have competing agendas in Somalia state building processes. Previous attempts to revamp peace building in Somalia were frustrated by a range of clan politics that included the issue of representations, agenda for peace considerations, external interests, inter-clan conflict memories, disputed peace meeting venues and the existence of peace spoilers. In view of these, [4] contends that most of the peace building convened were privileged for brokering power sharing agreement for a transitional central government over actual conflict resolution. At their worst, some of the agreements signed degenerated into crude cake-cutting exercises in which the agenda was reduced to allocation of cabinet positions by clan faction.

The contradicting policy reports and recommendations regarding the Somalia conflicts made by different scholars have further aggravated the situation for finding peace in Somalia. For example, [10] is of the view that the protracted Somalia conflict is as a result of the regional conflicting interests and other unresolved intra and interstate conflicts. Other scholars argued that Somalia lacks a reliable external actor in settling her disputes while others like [21] contend that the Somalia strategic position economically is the main factor for external interest. In spite of the varied interventions through external actor involvement, peace in Somalia has proven elusive. This study therefore attempts to investigate and explore this situation.

1.3 Objectives Of The Study

The general objective of the study was to evaluate the external actor involvement including state and non-state actors influencing peace building processes in Somalia.

The specific objectives of the study were to:

1. Explore the nature of external actor involvement in Somalia Peace building processes .

2. Assess the role of external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes

3.   Examine the challenges facing external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes.

1.4 Research Questions

The research was guided by the following questions derived from the specific objectives:

1.   What were the nature of external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes?

2.   What were the roles of external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes?

3.   What were the challenges faced by the external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes?

1.5 Justification Of The Study

The external actor involvement responding to Somalia crisis in 1991 lacked a coherent approach in dealing with the Somalia conflicts. The international relief and security operation that followed Somalia state collapse brought help to needy population, but failed in addressing genuine peace building processes. At their best, the external actor involvement presided over power sharing by warring clans than addressing the root causes of conflicts. For over two decades now, the country has been without a functioning government capable of restoring stability and winning international confidence. According to [22] Somalia is still considered as a failed state, most corrupt and insecure. This study will add value in filling this academic gap which posits that the state is the most powerful organization in all countries, even when it is not effective in implementing policy and provision of law and order, hence must be safeguarded by all means which include external and internal means.

At the policy level, this study will help inform the governments and states on the value of focusing on external peace initiatives and peace building strategies for national stability. It will prove useful to international conflict managers not only in the African region but to other parts of the world where post conflict peace initiatives and peace building services are required thus expected to influence policy formulation in critical meetings and conflict situation reviews for Somalia at major diplomatic summits and extra-ordinary meetings hitherto frequently called to consider the protracted conflicts in Somalia by the IGAD, AU and the UN.

1.6 Scope Of The Study

The study focuses on the strategies for peace building by addressing unique external actor such as state and non-state actors in conflicts and subsequent peace building. The study sought to investigate the validity and constraints of existing peace building processes and how they impacted on the overall peace by conducting an explanatory research inquiry. The study covers a period from 1993 when the first external humanitarian and peace building initiative was launched by the UN in Somalia following the collapsed state. Somalia has experienced one of the longest civil wars attributed to the collapse of the state in 1991 which resulted into the destruction of social fabrics and institutions necessary for governance making Somalia the most insecure and chaotic country in the world. In spite of its homogeneity of using the same language and adhering to the same religion, Somalia has remained an area with widespread lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and human rights abuses topping the list of failed states index in the world.   The study investigated the external actor involvement influencing peace building processes in Somalia. It explored to find out whether external actor involvement in peace building have been successful or not and the challenges facing it. The study was conducted from January to June, 2016 in the Southern parts of Somalia- Gedo region that borders with Kenya and Ethiopia.

The external actors in the Somali conflict since the collapse of the country's central government in 1991 are many. This study did not cover in details all the external actors' involvement in Somalia peace building processes as pronounced in the background to the study. Instead the study mainly focused on the interest and issues of two of Somali's immediate neighbouring states namely Ethiopia and Kenya, UN, AU (AMISOM) and IGAD that are actively involved in Somalia conflicts in response to the overall research questions.

II.   METHODOLOGY

The physical location is on the African continent and specifically the Horn of African region. Somalia is situated on the Eastern parts of Horn of Africa and lies between 08^0 -11^0 parallel North of the equarter and 42^0 - 49^0 Merdian East of the Greenwich. The territorial sovereignty of Somalia extends to the land, island, sea, sub-soil, air space and the

continental shelf. Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa with borders to Ethiopia in the west, to Kenya in the south-west and to the Republic of Djibouti in the north-west. The Equator passes through the southern tip of the country. The study was conducted in the Southern parts of Somalia with emphasis to Gedo an administrative region that borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. The study was conducted in six Districts occupied by the major Somalia clans that included; Dolo, Belet-Hawa, Luuq, El Wak, Garbaharey, and Bardera. The region is occupied by major clans:Marehan , Sheikhal in Luuq; Garre in El Wak; Asharaf and Gabaweyn in Dolo/Luuq; and Ajuran , Auliyahan , Jareer and Rahanweyn sub-clans in Bardera

According to [23] Somalia has an estimated universal population of 9 million people and the Gedo region has an estimated population of 328,378 persons. The study targeted 425 respondents from the following categories- UN, AU,AMISOM, IGAD,NGOs, CBOs, ENDF, KDF, SNA, Diplomatic Missions, Religious leaders, Farmers and Business community

Sample selection was determined according to [24] who recommends that 30% of population is representative in a research study. The following sample size was thus obtained using the conversion table as illustrated by [24]. The following population sample was determined as summarized and presented in the table.

TABLE: I.

S/No	POPULATION CATEGORY	SAMPLE SIZE	
1	**United Nation Table 3: Sample Size of the studys (UN)**	24	
2	African Union (AU)	24	
3	AMISOM	24	
4	IGAD	24	
5	International/ Foreign NGOs	24	
6	Local/Internal CBOs	24	
7	Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF)	24	
8	Kenya Defense Force (KDF)	24	
9	Somalia National Army (SNA)	24	
10	Diplomatic Missions	44	
11	Religious Leaders	44	
12	Farmers	44	
13	Business Community	44	**TOTAL 392**

Source: Field Data, 2016

Qualitative and quantitative methods were used in analysis and data presentation. They are qualitative in the sense that data collection and analysis were in the form of statements. Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 21 and Microsoft Excel were used to analyze the quantitative data. Frequency tables, graphs were used to present findings.

Limited by prohibitive cost of travelling, general suspicion and timing of the study which corresponded with the repatriation orders issued by Government of Kenya for the Somalia refuges in the Dadaab Camp. Other limitations experienced during the study included interviewing officials who were reluctant to discuss the limited government institutions, capacity and territorial reach of the Somalia Federal Government. Some participants were reluctant to share their identification for fear of reprisals from Al-Shabaab. Other participants avoided criticizing Al-Shabaab, particularly in focus group discussions, for fear of reprisals. While other participants were concerned that the study was an intelligence gathering mission for foreign agencies.

Somalia remains an area where terrorism, volatile and insecure conditions continue to motivate external interventions. This chapter presents the challenges currently facing external actors in Somalia by specifically focusing on the frontline states, sub-regional, regional and international community who support and facilitate humanitarian and peace building processes.

III. FINDINGS

3.1 Challenges Facing External Actors In Somalia Peace Building Processes

During the civil war that followed the ouster of the Siad Bare regime in 1991, hundreds of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies and other regional organizations came to Somalia to help the victims of the war and provide assistance to thousands of displaced people who were in desperate need of basic human requirements such as shelter, food, medicine and water. These external actors needed local partners to help them with the distribution of humanitarian aid and arrange local security and logistics. In this context, hundreds of civil society organizations (CSOs) were formed to meet the increased demand for local partners. Findings revealed that many of these organizations faced challenges in executing their mandates that included insecurity, lootings, peace spoilers, poor funding, culture, structures and poor coordination among service providers that forced some to withdraw their services, some remained and are still functioning while others like the US decided to collaborate with some locals and neighboring states [1].

Findings are in agreement with [2] that Peace building in a post conflict situation has several challenges ranging from peace spoilers, leaders and parties who believed that the emerging peace threatens their power, world view and interests. Somalia experienced one of the longest civil wars and anarchy in Africa. Reflecting on the views of the collapse of Somalia government in 1991 triggered looting, lawlessness and subsequent massive exodus of Somalis into the Diaspora[3]. Majority of respondents 90% argued that the third party actors who included NGOs who responded to Somalia crisis faced challenges in executing their core mandate and suffered heavy casualties in the hands of militia as they acted as spoilers in peace building initiatives. Accordingly, this marked the beginning of Somalia's socio-political, security and economic isolation in the international world as with local actors complicated every effort of peace building as some local leaders were not willing and eager for peace settlement [3]. The exclusion of women who were culturally disadvantaged peace meetings was a glaring gap noticed by the international community as contravening the Human Rights. Responding to structured questions on the challenges, one respondents argued that:

Women's role within the Somali society is restricted owing to the male domination of the society. Men are still controlling the key sectors of the economy and are predominantly represented in the political sphere. Women are facing greater challenges in gaining fuller representation in the political decision-making process. Women are still appointed by men and the quotas agreed upon have not yet been met, contributing to their marginalization in the political life. Their affiliation to several clans may be an advantage in conflict resolution but in political decision-making it has contributed to even more exclusion. There is no text stating clearly that women should not hold high-level political positions. However some Muslim scholars restrict the role of women in the public life on account of several reasons: women's moral vulnerability, women as a source of temptation and of social discord. The clan-based system does not provide women with the right to hold public office or any formal role in a traditional assembly. The major issue being for women to decide whether to represent their clan, the clan of their mother, father or husband. This exclusion of women from participating in the political sphere is therefore based on the belief that they would face a true conflict of interests. Women are very much dependent on the interpretation of both the customary law and the Islamic law. Although both laws underline the role of women in the society that is to say in the economic, social and political spheres, women are often unaware of their rights, have a limited or no access to them and finally are often subjected to a very strict interpretation by men of the Sharia Law.In conflict women may be partial or act as passive bystanders. There are many examples of women encouraging husbands to fight in order to defend their family, their community and their clan. Others have allowed the conflict to endure by mobilizing funds, feeding and taking care of the fighters. They also have encouraged violence against other clan women thus perpetuating divisions and conflicts. Women-based initiatives have also been criticized on account of their link and partnerships with international organizations. Women are also confronted with limited educational opportunities and economic resources. Opportunities for adult education are very rare and inaccessible for women. Moreover girls beyond the age of nine no longer attend school. Besides the access to education should also be a priority for boys and men. The high unemployment rate among men in Somalia has impacted on the family structure, weakening their role and identity and exerting even more pressure on women.

Findings revealed that previous attempts to revamp peace building in Somalia by external actors were frustrated by a range of clan politics that included the issue of representations, agenda for peace considerations, external interests, inter-clan conflict memories, disputed peace meeting venues and the existence of peace spoilers. Most of the peace building

convened by external actors were privileged for brokering power sharing agreement for a transitional central government over actual conflict resolution, some of the agreements signed degenerated into crude cake-cutting exercises in which the agenda was reduced to allocation of cabinet positions by clan faction [4]. Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. Negotiated peace often has losers; leaders and factions that do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties.

To provide more insight on the challenges emanating from the locals, the researcher posed the same question to FGDs in Nairobi. In response to the structured questions, the FGDs argued that the efficacy of customary law in the Somalia traditional circumstances rested on a relative balance in power between clans. However the arming of different clans during and after the Siad Bare regime typically left agricultural communities at a military disadvantage to better-armed pastoralist groups. Furthermore, during the initial years of the war agricultural communities faced occupation by militarily stronger clans with whom they had no established relationship or *Xeer*. In these circumstances, and in the absence of state protection, the rights of the weaker party were overrun. In a case where pastoralists are the aggressors, elders of the agricultural community will tend not to ask for a meeting to discuss the issue because they expect little recompense from the more powerful group. However, if the aggressor is from the agricultural community, customary law will be applied and compensation paid to restore the peace. In this regard, on a scale of 1 to 5. where 1 is totally agree and 5 is totally disagree, respondents were asked to rate the challenges that faced peace building in Somalia.

TABLE : II. Internal Challenges facing External actors

| Overall peace building in Somalia were affected by the following:	1	2	3	4	5
Effective Local Support	✓				
Diaspora Support					✓
Women Inclusion	✓				
Involvement of War Lords	✓				
Exclusion of Youth Leaders	✓				
External Interest	✓				
Involvement of Partisan States	✓				
Presence of Terrorist Cells	✓				
Planning Procedures	✓				
Location of Meeting Venues	✓				

Source: Field data, (2016)

Majority of respondents 90%(378) were of the opinion that primary(Local) factors including lack of involvement of women, youth and presence of the Al-Shabaab affected the peace building processes initiated by external actors. A damaging effect of the Somalia civil war has been the undermining of the *Xeer* that protected vulnerable groups – *Birmageydo,* 'those who are spared from the spear'. This includes women, children, the elderly, titled elders and religious leaders, and peace delegates. Respondents argued that the repeated violations of such codes have weakened this important function of traditional governance and resulted in the deaths of those who would normally be considered 'safe from harm' which is in congruence with [4].

Minority 10% (42) of the respondents exhibited that the diaspora plays an important role in the present peace processes by lobbying and collaborating with the international community. Others argued that lack of a functioning and effective national government structures and institutions poses dangerous threat to the success of peace building processes in Somalia as inter - intra conflict and division are still felt in various parts of the country. While 60% (252) of respondents were of the opinion that the emergence of armed warlords and business people during the anarchy of the civil war period is the primary reason for the failure of attempts to settle local Somali conflicts.

Lack of clear understanding by government officials on the relationships between federal states and national government functions in Somalia is also affecting peace building processes. The existing confusion in revenue collection, corruption and arbitrary law enforcement is behind the factors affecting stability in the country as observed by respondents. In a

closed ended question, respondents were asked whether the ongoing clan fragmentations were affecting peace building process by external actors. Opinion and response is summarized in Figure 1:

Source : Field Data, 2016.

Fig. 1. Challenges of   Clan Fragmentation

Majority of respondents 80% (336) were of the opinion that most difficulty challenge is the ongoing process of clan-fragmentation and distrust within the main clan families, which has led smaller sub-clans to identify their own leaders, hence complicating peace building processes. Respondents argued that the traditional clan elders were responsible for ensuring the peaceful co-existence of the community as a whole and for working to resolve local conflicts. However the circumstances of the civil war led some elders to mobilize their own clan militia for inter- and intra-clan fighting and to side with their kin, even when they were the aggressors. In the Somali cultural context, the declaration of responsibility – "I am an aggressor" – by the relevant party is critical to the success of traditional conflict resolution. If the responsible party declines to confess to being the aggressor, the reconciliation initiative usually failed [5]. Findings are in agreement with [1] that the breakdown of traditional customary law known as the *xeer* between pastoral and agricultural communities is affecting peace building processes in Somalia. In rural communities disputes over access to shared grazing or water sources and agricultural land are common and can become violent. In most cases a *Xeer* exists between co-habiting groups that governs social relations and access to communal resources. Before the collapse of the Somali state these kinds of conflicts were generally arbitrated successfully by elders using *Xeer*. Any clan member (or clan) who challenged the arbitration faced sanctions known locally as "*Maraado-Ta'siir"* by the clans concerned.

Prior to adoption of the existing Somalia provisional constitution through the Transitional Federal Government in August, 2012 many challenges were experienced in Somalia [6]. For instance, the confrontation between US marines and the Somali militia in Mogadishu in 1993 compelled the US government and other international actors to adopt disengagement approach to the conflict in Somalia. The US's relative disengagement after the "Black Hawk Down episode" encouraged the idea that Africans should resolve the continent's problems by themselves- commonly referred to as the African solution to African's problems 'approach. The disengagement from Somalia of western governments saw Ethiopia become a western proxy and main regional actor for the state of affairs in Somalia. The proxy actors together with war economist who benefited from the Somalia conflicts resisted peace settlements and hence became spoilers in peace initiatives and conference [7].

Regarding challenges experienced by the African region through AMISOM, IGAD and frontline states including Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the findings reveal that Military intervention remains controversial both when it happens and when it fails to happen. The Somali crisis has increasingly reflected a divide between factions backed by Ethiopia and Kenya versus those enjoying backing in the Arab world. Neither the African Union nor the League of Arab States are viewed as neutral on Somalia affairs [3]. The IGAD is divided and viewed by Somalis as currently dominated by Ethiopia and

Kenya who have competing agendas in Somalia state and peace building processes. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary as was the case of Kenya when KDF invaded Somalia in 2011 without the UNSC mandate but joined the AMISOM in 2012 contributing 4000 troops [8].

Matters of national sovereignty remain the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and noninterference in their domestic affair, continue to be the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community's decisive factors in choosing between intervention and non-intervention. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, matters of sovereignty and non- interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide, war crimes and internationalization of conflicts as the case in Somalia [2].

In this regard, respondents were asked in both closed and open ended questions to identify the challenges facing the external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes and specifically focusing on state and non-state actors including the neighboring countries and organizations supported by states. Figure16 summarizes opinion and responses expressed.

Source : Field Data, 2016

Fig. 2. Evaluation of Challenges facing Frontline States

Findings revealed that a growing problem in Somalia is identification and support of appropriate peace building mechanisms. As illustrated in Figure 13 majority of respondents 50% (210) were of the opinion that both Kenya and Ethiopia have backing of other international community(s) in their operations in Somalia. The US was singled out as using Nairobi as the base for UNISOM and Addis Ababa as her base for proxy interventions in Somalia. Majority over 50% were of the opinion that the international community through the UN systems have been instrumental for humanitarian and peace building processes, while 30% (126) were of the opinion that the regional body(AU) and the sub-regional organizations (IGAD) has been instrumental in peace building, while 20% (84) of respondents were of the opinion that both Kenya and Ethiopia are not interested in overall peace in Somalia other than defending their territorial integrity and sovereignty inside a foreign country.

Analysis of data collected reflect that there is a common believe that most of the peace processes launched since 1991, including the US–UN peace mission in 1992, came from several unconnected, and sometimes contradictory and competing directions; Firstly, most peace initiatives by neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti) were competing to bring peace in Somalia. The problem with the frontline states initiatives was that each had a vested

interest, and tended to favor one faction over the other[9]. Majority of respondents argued that the external actors eager to resolve the conflicts are not seen as neutral inside Somalia due to their previous involvement with some internal actors, or have a history there which renders them suspect in the eyes of some Somalis, an opinion also shared by [10].

The views reflected by [3] that the UN has a controversial and difficult history in Somalia ranging from the blame of misdiagnosis, poor methodology to delayed interventions in 1993 eroded its potential to broker peace talks were justified by this study as majority 70% (294) respondents argued that the UN mission in Somalia was handed an impossible task and therefore was doomed from the outset to fail. Somalia was and remains a violent and fractious conflict, which was not amenable to the "quick-fix" solution demanded by impatient external actors. Moreover, it was clear from the beginning that several Somali warlords viewed the UN intervention and its mandate to assist in peace building and broad-based political rehabilitation as a direct threat to their power base and were determined to disrupt and undermine the operation [4]. When the US refused to embark on an aggressive campaign to disarm the Somali militias, leaving both disarmament and political reconciliation to the UN, many external actors particularly from the civilian components felt that the US was handing the UN an untenable mission that was destined to spiral into protracted violence [7]. The UN clearly contributed to its own demise in Somalia, with shortsighted political strategies and a distressingly irresponsibility and bureaucratic operation in the field. Responses from the structured questions 50% (210) of respondents revealed that the most disappointing shortcoming of the UNOSOM operation in Somalia was inability to identify and work cooperatively with legitimate Somali representatives in the course of fostering reconciliation and political rehabilitation occasioned by existing collapsed state and the complex political culture of Somalia. Findings reveal that the UN, had little knowledge of Somali society and thus erred when it chose to place the faction leaders at the center of national reconciliation efforts, and when it subsequently abandoned grass-roots political constituencies in a vain attempt to broker a quick deal between warlords.

The findings are in agreement with [11] who argued that there were those in the UN who felt that their preoccupation with the warlords was simple "realism," contending that the militias were the sources of the conflict and therefore had to be at the center of a solution. But this was a simplistic assessment as it confused the ability to destroy and loot with the ability to govern. Secondly, it failed to understand that the warlords' power base rested on fear, instability, and conquest, not on peace building, disarmament, and representative governance. Finally, it sought to facilitate a pact among the warlords to create an interim government without first achieving national reconciliation; an approach which would have triggered renewed civil war had it succeeded. UN wasted millions of dollars, and precious time and credibility, courting recalcitrant warlords to attend peace conferences which invariably failed [7]. Those they had invited had no interest in an end to the conflict. The UN comes under harsh criticism by some members of respondents for its delayed attention to Somalia in the early years of the crisis (1988-92), while the US is blamed for its unwillingness to address Somalia following the failed UNOSOM mission in 1993. Other challenges of the UN as an external actor in Somalia peace building focus not on political will but on poor performance.

The UN and other mediators have been accused of bungling peace talks due to gross incompetence, weak capacity, lack of neutrality, conflicts of interest, insistence on inappropriate timeframes, and lack of understanding of Somali political culture. These were the criticisms of UNOSOM mediation in 1993-94 as expresses by respondents and resurfaced again in the Eldoret phase of the Kenyan-based peace talks in 2002-04 as reflected by [4]. Added to this are criticisms that the external actors failed to coordinate their policies and have rival interests, resulting in opportunities for Somali leaders to engage in "forum shopping." Another critique of mediation which was periodically voiced in the FGDs is the practice of isolating delegates in foreign hotels instead of convening the conferences in country. While some of these criticisms are unfair, others reflected accurate concerns about the very uneven quality of external actor interventions on Somalia peace building processes.

In this regard, the study sought to single out specific rating from various external actors with a view to provide deeper insight on the challenges. In this regard, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is totally agree and 5 is totally disagree, respondents were asked to rate the following statements regarding the external actor involvement in Somalia peace building Processes from 1993 to 2015. Table III: summarizes opinions and responses expressed.

TABLE: III: Contribution of External Actors towards peace in Somalia

The Overall involvement of the following Organizations led to peace and state building in Somalia:	1	2	3	4	5
United Nations (UN)					✓
African Union (AU)					✓
IGAD					✓
European Union (EU)					✓
NATO					✓
World Bank					✓
COMESA					✓
East African Community (EAC)					✓
AMISOM					✓
League of Arab States (LAS)	✓				
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)	✓				

Source: Field data, (2016)

80% (336) of respondents are of the opinion that secondary actors particularly UN, AU, IGAD, NATO , EAC and AMISOM dominates list of external actors while frontline states have approached the Somali crisis from the perspective of their own national security interests. The Arab countries who considered that since Somalia was a member of the Arab League were ranked as the most trusted external actors and 60% of respondents felt that they were qualified to help their Somali Arab brothers in their plight. These countries included Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. The so-called 'Arab initiative' was also hindered by the competitive manner that its members showed when dealing with various Somali factions [4].

Each of these countries tried to show that it cared for the Somalis more than others, and thus all attempts to make the initiative a collective Arab approach to problem was frustrated. 50% of respondents rated the AU, through the Inter-governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and AMISOM as responsible for initiating formula for peaceful resolution of the Somali war. Several meetings were conducted these external auspices between 1992 and 1999 with the aim of bringing an end to the conflict, but most of their efforts were in vain. The failure of their initiative is mainly due to disagreements among the IGAD members over how to move forward, especially between 1991 and 2001, with Ethiopia dominating the chair of IGAD for close to ten years since Eritrea withdrew her membership [7].

Findings also reveal that the European states led by Italy, France and Britain, are also trying to bring some form of understanding among Somalis, but all their efforts failed to bridge the gaps between the warring parties. 30% of individual African leaders tried to mediate and offered some suggestions to the warring parties. Again, these efforts were unsuccessful. The European initiative was seen by some Somali warlords as a colonialist attempt to regain leverage over the country and was thus viewed unfavorably by the majority of the Somali warring factions. As for individual African leaders' initiatives, most of those who tried to mediate had very little knowledge of the internal Somali clan politics. In 2009, the European Union met in Nairobi under the chairmanship of AU to support the Transition Federal Government which was experiencing financial crisis. Table IV summarizes contributions and pledges made International Community's towards Involvement in support towards Somalia.

TABLE : IV: International Communitys FinanciaL Support to Somalia During BrusselS Meeting -23.4.2009.

COUNTRY	PLEDGES MADE IN BRUSSELS	PLEDGES PAID BY 26.11.2009	OTHER DISBURSEMENT ON BILATERAL ASSISTANCE
1. **Britain**	$ 14,619,883	**UNSOA Bank For AMISOM TRUST FUND** $ 14,515,000 (paid)	DFID -£ 11million to strengthen Somalia security sector -£ 10million to refurbish government buildings -£60 million to pay salaries for Somalia MPs, -£15 million for the rule of law program
			Participation in the European Union Naval Force's 'operation Atalanta' off the Somalia coast
			Participates as a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia
2. **Italy**	$ 5,208,000	**AU Bank Account for AMISOM** $ 5,208,000 **(paid)**	1. $15,820,036 for various projects in Somalia in 2009 2. Euros 200,000 assistance to the humanitarian UNHCR appeal for Somalia
			Participates as a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia
3. **Germany**	-	-	1. Participates in the European Union Naval Force's 'operation Atalanta' off the Somalia coast 2. Federal Foreign Office of Germany donated **3 Million Euros** for humanitarian aid and development in the year 2008
			Participates as a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia
4. Kenya	$3,000,000		
5. Angola	$100,000	**UNSOABank**, not yet received	
6. Australia	$383, 400	**UNSOA Bank for AMISOM TRUST FUND** $383,400 **(paid)**	1. $ 1.5 million to the United Nations Humanitarian appeal for Somalia.500,000 to support AMISOM.
7.Belgium	$646,831	**UNPOS Bank** $646,831 (expected but not yet received)	1. $1,477,105 for humanitarian assistance
8.Czech Republic	$150,000	**UNSOA Bank for AMISOM TRUST FUND (paid)**	1. Contributed to the EU #40 million support to AMISOM in 2008. 2. Participates in the Union's joint naval patrol off Somalia Coast and the Gulf of Aden.
9.Denmark	$1,737,620	**UNSOABank for AMISOM TRUST FUND**, (not yet received)	1. Denmark through UN OCHA -$10,364,231 for Humanitarian assistance to Somalia/Material relief and assistance through Danish Red Cross Through UNICEF DKK 18,000,000 supporting Water and Sanitation Programme.EU Commission $ 32,978,250
10.Japan	$ 9,000,000	**UNSOA Bank for AMISOM TRUST FUND (Paid)**	1. $64.5 Million for humanitarian needs and security sector enhancement.$12,740,000 for supporting humanitarian purposes.

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			2. Participates in the anti-piracy operation in the Somalia Coast and Gulf of Aden.
11.South Korea	$ 1,500,000	**UNSOA Bank for AMISOM TRUST FUND ($500,000)**expected, not yet paid	**$1,000,000 expected towards recovery**
12.Malta	$ 13, 293	**UNSOA Bank for AMISOM TRUST FUND (paid)**	
13. Netherlands	$1,560,000	**AU Bank Account $1,560,000 (paid)**	1. (ACOTA) program 2. $ 16,963,359 For supporting humanitarian activities in Somalia
14. Norway	$3, 000,000	**UNPOS Bank $500,000 (expected but yet to be received)**	1. **UNPOS Bank $ 2,500,000** towards recovery (expected but not paid) 2. $ 35 million to Somalia's assistance towards recovery in 2008. 3. Participates in Operation Atalanta to combat piracy off the Somalia coast as well as ICG on piracy.
15. Saudi Arabia	$ 18, 000,000	**UNPOS Bank $6,000,000 (expected but yet to be paid)**	
16. Spain	$7,812,000	**AU Bank Account** (paid) Awaiting confirmation of allocation as follows:Somalia police: $1, 5 Million Capacity building: $1.5 Million, AMISOM activities (political, civilian-mediation): $3Million	1. $ 2, 592, 136 For humanitarian support.
17. Sweden	$1,500,000	**AU Bank Account** (Paid)	1. $15,817,963 for humanitarian support to Somalia.
18. Turkey	$2,000,000	a) **UNPOS Bank $300,000 (paid)** b) **UNSOA Bank for AMISOM TRUST FUND $500,000 (Paid)**	1. Turkey works with the ICG on Somalia to support Somalia's reconstruction and development. 2. Participates in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somalia coast.
19.USA	$26,000,000	**GOS(Government of Somalia)Bank Account** $10,000,000 (Paid) $16,000,000 (Paid to Contractors)	1.Total USA government Humanitarian assistance to Somalia $136,604,306 divided as: USAID Office of Food for Peace(USAID/FFP)- $120,069,600 USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance(OFDA) -|$9,084,706 US Department of State's Bureau of Population,

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|			Refugees and Migration(State/PRM)-$7,450,000
20.European Union	$94,655,400	**Project Implementation Units/Contractors**	1. EU 45.8 Million since 2006 to support Somalia refugees in Kenya.EU 35.5 Million to support AMISOMEU 13.3 Million for the rule of law since 2003.EU 215.4 Million for year 2008-2013 for projects Programmes namely –Governance 30 million Euros, - Education 30 million Euros - Food and Nutrition 4 million
21. League of Arab States	$9,000,000	**GOS(Government of Somalia) Bank Account $ 1,500,000(Paid)**	1. $ 1 million transferred to the Somalia TFG to help in the reconstruction of the Somalia security forces.A conference of Arab leaders in 2009 will commit more funds to Somalia.
22.Finland			1. Project proposals under consideration$ 7,000,000 for humanitarian support 2. Aid to refugees ongoing.
23.Libya			1. Refugee resettlement and immigration assistance
24.Russian Federation			1. Food aid to the Somalia population. 2. $ 1,000,000 for humanitarian support
25.China			1. Provided logistical support to the Burundi and Ugandan contingent in Somalia. 2. Participates in the joint naval patrol with other EU nations, off the Somalia Coast. 3. $500,000 for humanitarian support.

Source: AMISOM 2016

As indicated in Table 17, over 60% of the external actors that pledged to support the Somalia TFG in 2009 in a Brussels meeting in April 2009 by November, 2009 had not honored their pledges. The involvement of EU amounting to 45% of the total pledges indicate that the European Union is the largest source of external supporter to Somalia peace building processes. The same position still stands as other members drown from EU such as Turkey is the major and physically active external actor inside Somalia. The US and other key external players are operating outside Somalia and specifically in Nairobi [12]. During the FGDs, it emerged that the Somali experience shows that UN must be kept under constant pressure from "watch-dog" nongovernmental organizations to insure that she does not overlook the very people she pledged to assist by 1993.

Scholars like [7], [3] and [5] argue that the international community did not deliver the much needed peace through peace processes in Somalia. Their position is further supported by [13] that post conflict reconstruction and national reconciliation is not easy it takes long duration and heavy expenses that requires the government, NGOs and Civil Society to support. It also needs Somali experts, tribal elders, scholars, religious scholars, academics, technocrats, businessmen, women, youth and the different Professionals to plan properly what to do and to implement and execute strategically and intelligently. Some scholars like [3] argue that without the help of the international community, donors, African union, IGAD, and Arab countries and neighboring countries the Somali government cannot effectively execute and implement durable peace. This observation is further supported by [9] that Peace will not come overnight and the peace brought by foreigners is not a peace; although the role of AMISOM was very helpful and impressive but Somalia needs peace brought by its people and yes it should be involved by the outsiders and international community but not as deep as they are in Mogadishu and many parts in south Somalia today. This position is also shared by [3] who contends that Somalia peace requires that the Somali people to resolve their own conflict on their ways and using their own home grown methods.

Findings revealed that peace building in Somalia involves a great number and variety of stakeholders – starting with the citizens of the Country where peace building is underway. It is neither a purely political, security nor developmental process, but one that must bring together security, political, economic, and social and human rights elements in a coherent

and integrated way, an opinion also shared by [18]. Respondents were asked in both closed and open ended questions on the challenges facing third party actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes and particularly the source of the challenges. Opinions and responses expressed were thematically grouped into community, national government (SFG), terrorism and partners. Figure 3 presents opinions expressed in form of percentages and graph.

Source: Field data, 2016

Fig. 3. Key challenges facing external actors

Findings are in agreement with [2] that Peace building in Somalia faces challenges because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders in the community, political factions, terror groups and other partners to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. Negotiated peace often has losers; leaders and factions that do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties. For example, the most perfectly crafted power sharing institutions in the world are useless if one of the parties does not want to share power. Even the best-designed settlements may be attacked by leaders and parties who decide that the kind of peace in question is not in their interest.

As indicated in figure 6, majority of respondents 60% (252) were of the view that uncoordinated third party approaches and peace building is the biggest challenge facing the NGOs and CBOs in Somalia. They operate under different mandates and have different objectives which necessarily does not correspondent to other partners, hence has implications on overall peace building in Somalia. Similarly, majority of respondents especially from the FGDs were of the view that terrorism activities in Somalia affects the local confidence towards activities of certain NGOs and more so that lacks Muslim patronage. 20% (84) of respondents supported this opinion while 10% (42) believed that both the local community and government were hindrance to the international community peace building efforts. One respondent argued that:

Peace can only come where the values of unity and its importance are known and where harmony, respect and Wellbeing are the critical points to be raised. Somalia's multitude of "warlords" are to blame for repeatedly spoiling peace processes and efforts to revive state authority. A more nuanced view of Somali spoilers claims that a wide range of local actors, including business people and some civic leaders, also profited from continued state collapse and work against efforts to revive a central state even as they work to promote general stability and public order. Still others argued that Somalia's inability to embrace peace reflects widespread public fear that a revived central state will be used as a tool of oppression and expropriation as occurred under Siad Bare. The conflict in Somalia is unique in comparison to other international conflicts because it began with a civil war within a relatively hegemonic culture in terms of religion, language and ethnicity. Historically, Somalia was a European colony that was divided into five states. These dynamics, in combination with the Cold War stimulating exploitation and oppression and Somali wars with neighboring states, created a clash of political ideologies in Somalia . The Somalia president Siad Bare, was overthrown in 1991 due to the instability that resulted when Western foreign aid was withdrawn after the Cold War . This event was followed by a series of cross-clan

disputes, which resulted in massacres, famine, mass displacement within and outside of Somalia, and the collapse of social and economic infrastructure. This ultimately ended in the divide between the northern and southern regions of Somalia.

In the UN peace building context, both military and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing about a specific outcome that will fundamentally change the dynamics of the situation as pointed out by the respondent, and reflected by [4]. This position is justified by this study as more than 50% (210) expressed the same opinion. The close cooperation between military and civilian partners in the UN peace building context does thus not have the same implications for the security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context. Some of the actions undertaken by military units in the latter category, for instance, the provision of 'free medical camps' to the local population by UN military units, have been a source of irritation to the humanitarian community because they have been reported as, or confused with humanitarian assistance. Findings revealed that these kinds of military actions in support of the community should be distinguished from humanitarian assistance. The primary motive of the military unit for providing the medical service is to build a good relationship with the local population, to improve the image of their unit and the peace operation, and to build confidence in the peace process. In situations where a peace operation is dealing with elements hostile to its presence, a good relationship with the local community is essential for obtaining information from the local population and to minimize the risk of hostile acts carried out with the protection of the local population. The medical services provided by UN military units are not necessarily lifesaving, although in some individual cases they may be. The medical services are more akin to those being provided by a local clinic and in some cases it may be quite specialized, for instance, cataract operations and dental services.

Findings reveal that the political situation in Somalia remains fragile as the term of the current Government is coming to an end in August 2016. Soon after assuming office in September 2012, the present Somalia Federal Government developed a road map dubbed 'Vision 2016' intended to achieve six specific political goals [4]. Critical among these included a pledge to hold democratic elections on the basis of universal suffrage, transform Somalia's provisional constitution and institutionalize federalism through the establishment of regional administrations. Further, the government was supposed to constitute the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC); Boundaries and Federation Commission (BFC), enact key election and constitutional court legislations.

Somalia remains an area where terrorism, radicalism, fundamentalism, volatile and insecure conditions continue to motivate external interventions. This concern was raised by one respondent while responding to challenges facing peace buildings in Somalia by external actors. His voice was captured as follows:

Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia cannot be fully understood outside the context of international Islamic terrorist grouping and the post 1991 stateless situation in Somalia. After the fall of Siad Barre clan extremism surfaced in Somalia which greatly weakened pan Somali nationalism. Clan loyalty became the order of the day. Evidently, Islamists begun to argue that the only alternative to clannism and the failed Somali nationalism is political Islam. Evidently, Islamic fundamentalism is being used as an alternative unifying factor (ideology) by the Somali fundamentalist movement. The stateless situation did not only create a fertile ground for the emergence and development of Islamic fundamentalism as a political trend in Somalia. But it also became conducive for the free movement of extremist and terrorist forces. The absence of a responsible government, administrative apparatus, organized politics and government or privates business in Somalia became a blessing in disguise for fundamentalists to fill in the vacuum and gave them a comparative advantage over the other forces who lack any kind of ideology. Their strength emanates from their organized nature, external financial help and the ideological orientation, radical Islam, which transcends mere clannism or Somali nationalism. Although traditionally clan loyalty is more important than any religious loyalty in Somalia, war weariness, desperation, eagerness for peace and order as well as widespread poverty seem to have attracted the youth to join the fundamentalist camp. That is why Islamists in Somalia target the youth more than any other group for terrorist activities. Undoubtedly Islam preaches peace and harmony but Islamic extremists in Somalia tend to use political Islam as a weapon of eliminating enemies and peace forces in the area. In fact my fear is that Islamic extremists are trying to destroy the long held tolerance and harmony among Muslims and Christians in the horn of Africa. As in many other parts of the world, Islamists in Somalia sharply distinguish themselves from the idea of traditional Islam. They think that traditional Islam and its traditional leaders (with their clerical subservience) has failed to preserve the essential meaning of Islam in contemporary world and society. So Islamists in may ways represent a profoundly modernist movement compatible with modern technology and secular education. That is partly the reason why the majority of contemporary Islamists emerge not from the traditional centers of Islamic learning (mosques) but from secular universities and scientific or technical

training centers. The same is true with Somalia. ……Now the world mainly the U.S is engaged in a fight against international terrorism. If the world (mainly the U.S) is serious about the fight against terrorism, Somali Islamic terrorists are no less dangerous than the Taliban, ISIS and the Boko Haram in West Africa or the Al Qaeda

In view of the responses captured regarding the present fragile state of insecurity in Somalia despite the numerous external actor involvement in peace building processes, the next chapter discuses conclusions and recommendations required. Meanwhile the success of the post 2016 period will largely depend on how the electoral process is managed in the later parts of this year (2016). The process will be deemed to be successful if it over comes the present challenges and confers legitimacy to the emerging federal and regional institutions throughout Somalia. For Kenya and the region, a lasting remedy to terrorism, piracy, insecurity, radicalization, fundamentalism and the repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya is most desirable.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examined the main challenges facing peace building processes in Somalia. As evidenced in this chapter and throughout the peace building processes in Somalia, during the civil war that followed the ouster of the Siad Bare regime in 1991, hundreds of external actors came to Somalia to help the victims of the war and provide assistance to thousands of displaced people who were in desperate need of food, medicine and water. The findings revealed that many of these organizations faced challenges in executing their mandates that included insecurity, lootings, peace spoilers, poor funding, culture, structures and poor coordination among service providers that forced some to withdraw their services, some remained and are still functioning while others like the US decided to collaborate with some locals and neighboring states including Kenya and Ethiopia. This complicated the inevitable search for peace by external actors in Somalia as potential external actors are considered as allies of the US or other forces with hidden agendas against the global Islamic faith.

The chapter reflects that the present Somali crisis is characterised by the close interaction between internal and external factors. The internal factor relates to the battle for power between the different factions. The conflict could take a tribal character, or may be masked by an ideological gloss – whether transparent or opaque. The internal factor competes for impact with the external factor. The latter contributed to ensuring that the Somali crisis became, over time, part of the regional conflict between states in the region. Even Ethiopia, through its involvement in Somalia, seemed as if it were in conflict with Eritrea on the one hand and with Egypt on the other.

Most of the external peace initiatives carried out since 1991 failed to address the fact that the government institutions installed at independence were too weak to meet the needs of a vast country like Somalia. Part of the challenges identified by this study is the lack of a clear and shared formula by external actor involvement in handling peace processes. The chapter acknowledges that Peace building processes creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. Negotiated peace often has losers; leaders and factions that do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties. Moreover, weaponry used to fuel conflicts in Somalia by both the Al-Shabaab and militia groups are basically obtained and supplied external actors.

The chapter also acknowledges that the Somali war was not instigated by outsiders. It is, therefore imperative that the solution to the conflict ought to be found by the Somalis themselves through involvement of an integrated external actor mission that has components of recovery and reconstruction through a well shared and coordinated formula. This observation leads to the next chapter which is based on summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations

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